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There has been an expansion of interest in nature-society issues within human 
geography spurred by the rich, sophisticated analyses of environment-development 
issues within the Third World.  This latter work emerged out of the fusion of cultural 
ecology and the political economy of resource use, but scholars are increasingly 
turning towards post-structuralism to engage with the complex, mutual constitution of 
symbolic and material struggles over land and resources.  Yet to some extent, these 
theoretical trends are moving nature-society geography away from engagement with 
physical ‘natural’ processes despite rhetoric to the contrary.  In this paper I raise the 
question of whether current work in critical Geography on nature-society issues 
adequately tackles the ‘so-what’ issues of socio- natural change.  Do political ecology 
and science studies—the two, broadly defined approaches currently favoured by most 
critical geographers—accomplish what is required theoretically and methodologically 
to engage with fundamental issues of social and environmental change?  I suggest that 
when used in isolation both approaches are inadequate to point us in politically useful 
directions.  Instead I argue for more engagement with ecological theory and 
ecological processes as they articulate with social processes in contingent, dynamic 
ways. 
 
That there is reason to be worried about nature I am taking for granted in this paper.  
The concern then is how do we understand environmental problems and how do we 
go about trying to change them?  I am beginning from the assumption that critical 
geographers have two broad issues they address in relationship to environmental 
change.
1
  First, critical geographers examine the cultural politics of environmental 
issues at all scales.  This includes the production of knowledge about nature and 
environmental change; discourses of environment; policy implementation and policy 
making processes; social movements related to the environment; and the relationship 
of environmental issues to political-economic and cultural processes.  Second, critical 
geographers examine the consequences of environmental change for socio-natural 
systems.  While much attention has been paid to the social consequences of 
environmental change, I argue that the physical, environmental consequences have 
been largely neglected.  This omission has serious implications for our understanding 
of the social consequences if one takes seriously the insistence by many critical 
geographers that social systems cannot be separated from environmental systems.  I 
will try to illustrate this point more fully throughout this paper. 
 
I believe the neglect of environmental consequences derives largely from our 
theoretical and methodological commitments.  I will first trace the contributions of 
political ecology and science studies to these issues and point out some of the lacuna 
in these approaches.  In particular the recent turn towards science studies needs to be 
critically examined as I argue that these approaches, while providing some very 
valuable insights, are seriously limited in their ability to engage with the 
consequences of socio-natural change.  I conclude with some questions and 
suggestions about the direction critical geography needs to move to engage more 
directly with the social-natural issues at stake. 
 
                                                
1
 I do not intend to police the boundaries of nature-society geography, rather I have arrived at these 
issues from a reading of the literature.  They basically encompass the three outlined by Castree (2001 p. 
10-16), I have collapsed them here as this is how I initially saw them.  It could be useful to discuss if 
these (two-three) agendas are sufficient. 
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I want to begin by briefly defining some terms to avoid confusion and debates over 
the epistemological origins of these terms.  I use ‘ecology’ to refer to the set of 
scientific disciplines that are engaged in examining physical environmental change.  
While the academic discipline of Ecology may not necessarily encompass all the 
sciences I have in mind, I use ecology as a short –hand for research into biophysical 
change (including physical geography) and corresponding representations of nature 
within those disciplines.  Nature I use as a word to refer to the physical, material non-
human world—that world that would continue to exist if all humans were wiped off 
the planet tomorrow.  Environment I use to represent human understandings of nature.  
While I agree with many social constructionists (cf. Demeritt 1998) that ‘nature’ 
cannot be understood outside the parameters of ‘environment’ as I’ve defined these 
terms, I also prefer to retain a category that can capture the sum of ‘environments’ as 
different people understand them, and the physical world we inhabit as analytically 
separate from environments(s).  Socio-nature I thus use to describe the material and 
symbolic manifestation of the social-nature nexus, what has also been called 
socionature by Erik Swyngedouw (as cited in Castree 2001 p. 13).
2
  Finally, 
environmentalism I use to refer to mainstream environmental movements such as 
Greenpeace, the Nature Conservancy, etc. 
 
Political ecology and science studies approaches, including actor network theory 
(ANT) have engaged with the first of my two issues remarkably well.  The politics of 
environmental issues have been examined at a variety of scales and with different 
theoretical tools.  Comprehensive reviews of this work have been done elsewhere (see 
for example Braun and Castree 1998; Bryant 1998; Bryant 2001; Castree 2001; 
Castree and MacMillan 2001; Demeritt 1998; Peet and Watts 1996; Sneddon 2000; 
Whatmore 1999).  Here I want to briefly trace some of the major contributions in 
order point out how they fail to engage with the second issue I raised above: the 
consequences of environmental change for socio-natural systems.  Of course in 
constructing this kind of review there are many scholars whose work spans the two 
approaches and therefore some of the critiques do not apply easily to them.  
Nevertheless, this seemed to be the clearest way to present them.  I have arrived at 
these conclusions and critique based on a systematic, although not necessarily 
comprehensive review of the literatures in these two areas, thus I apologise in advance 
if I have missed work that is moving closer to the direction I have in mind. 
 
Political Ecology  
Political ecology, as it has risen out of cultural ecology, the political economy of 
development, marxism and post-structuralism encompasses a diversity of theoretical 
and methodological approaches (Bryant 1998; Peet and Watts 1996).  While political 
ecology is not uniform, as a whole this body of work has placed four key issues 
within the centre of nature-society geography.   
 
First, political ecology has demonstrated the importance of examining the linkages 
between local environmental issues and global political-economic processes.  The 
                                                
2
 In some ways I have arbitrarily chosen these words—environment for example carries a lot of 
baggage (Castree 2001).  I certainly do not see them as unproblematic, my main intention is clarity and 
simplicity in diction.  ‘Nature’ in particular has presented me with many difficulties because the 
adjective is ‘natural’.  I have no intention of invoking all the meanings of natural.  Unless I state 
otherwise I simply mean ‘processes of/in nature’ (i.e. socio-natural processes). 
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articulation of different localities with capitalist production is inextricably linked to 
the exploitation of ‘natural resources’ both for subsistence by increasingly 
marginalised primary producers, and for profit.  This insight has placed an 
examination of production processes and labour relations in the centre of 
environmental issues, something which often continues to be overlooked by 
mainstream environmentalism.  It has also served to undermine neo-Malthusian 
arguments about population pressure and ecological limits by demonstrating how 
population pressure is not directly correlated with ecological decline but rather is 
closely linked to political-economic pressures on resource consumption (Blaikie 
1985).  This is equally true for marginalised producers as it is for capitalist 
exploitation of resources (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Hecht 1985; Peet and Watts 
1996).  Thus, political ecology has drawn attention to the inter-relationships between 
ecological impacts and socio-economic power relations. 
 
The second issue that has been explored by political ecology is the ways in which 
knowledge about nature is mobilised and contested politically.  These knowledges 
include ecological representations of nature and ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’ knowledges 
that often combine understandings of physical processes with social histories of the 
land.  Knowledges in this sense are used both to promote particular political positions 
and to contest ownership claims (Jarosz 1996; Moore 1996; Schroeder and Suryanata 
1996; Zimmerer 1996).  In other words, as Escobar argues, particular kinds of 
ecological knowledge are used to justify sustainable development programs that may 
be at core rooted in other priorities (Escobar 1995).  Or as Jarosz has shown, the 
ecological effects of different land use strategies are mobilised to accomplish 
objectives in relation to settlement and distribution of population.  Thus, swidden 
agriculture (shifting cultivation) has been constructed as damaging fragile tropical 
forests in order to undermine ownership claims by forest dwelling groups (Jarosz 
1996).  The construction of discourses about environment(s) then, is mutually 
constitutive of social-political struggles over land use.   
 
The third and closely related insight that arises out of political ecology is that 
contestations over environment(s) inscribe the kinds of land use and management 
practices dominant in particular places.  Thus, environmental justice activists have 
struggled to define ‘environment’ as encompassing everyday spaces in an attempt to 
gain the recognition that issues facing their communities are ecological issues and not 
‘just’ public health issues (Chiro 1996; Pulido 1997).  In other contexts, geographers 
have shown how the understanding of trees as ecologically (and commercially) 
beneficial has led to the planting of fast-growing, green, but otherwise invasive and 
ecologically problematic tree species (Robbins 2001;  see also Shiva 1988).  
Conceptions of nature and what is natural then, strongly shape the kinds of land use 
and management interventions that are considered acceptable within different 
environments.   
 
Finally, political ecology has examined the potential of environmental issues for 
mobilising social movements that link people across gender, class, race and 
nationality.  Empirical investigations of nature-based social movements have 
demonstrated the key roles that women and other marginalised people play within 
them (Peet and Watts 1996; Rangan 1997; Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter et al. 1996).  
Globally, some third world groups have been successful at soliciting the support of 
first world environmentalists for their causes, possible because both groups share a 
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common concern for (a common) environment (Watts 1998).  Concern over changes 
in nature resonates for diverse groups of people if they can sufficiently agree on what 
environment they are protecting.  The political potential of nature-society issues for 
causing systemic social change therefore seems to be more promising than 
movements based on class, although complex power negotiations cannot be neglected.   
 
These four issues have been explored in the Third World by political ecologists and 
continue to be explored in different contexts (urban, first world, urban third world) by 
critical geographers (see for example Adams 1990; Batterbury, Forsyth et al. 1997; 
Bebbington and Batterbury 2001; Carney 1996; Freidberg 2001a; Freidberg 2001b; 
Nesbitt and Weiner 2001).  To me one of the very important insights coming from this 
body of work is the way that economic development issues are always environmental 
issues, although this insight is not always explicitly acknowledged. 
 
Early, political ecology was accused of being not political enough or ecological 
enough (Peet and Watts 1996).  Most political ecologists have responded to the need 
for more politics by more carefully examining relations of power symbolically and 
materially at multiple scales, drawing on post-structuralism and feminist studies to do 
so.  The charge of not enough ecology, however, has proven to be far more difficult.  
With very few, but important, exceptions (cf. Robbins 2001; Scoones 1997; Sneddon 
2000; Zimmerer 1994), political ecologists have not attempted to engage with 
ecological data.  Instead, nature continues to be treated as a background or context for 
the social-political disputes over land and resources—despite acknowledgement of 
their mutual constitution.  Studies that do engage with ecological change (but not 
ecological data) often treat it as an impact or result of the social-political struggles and 
rarely examine the way that a dynamic nature constitutes the struggles that result.  
And perhaps most importantly, ‘ecology’ remains a separate, but interactive domain 
with ‘society’.  The mutual constitution of them is rarely treated in a theoretically and 
methodologically meaningful way. 
 
In an attempt to address these problems, one new focus within political ecology is on 
environmental imaginaries and the ways in which these imaginaries are linked to the 
social and cultural processes of land use and ownership (Nesbitt and Weiner 2001; 
Watts and Peet 1996).  While engagement with these environments is important, what 
this work fails to do is critically engage with what these imaginaries might tell us 
about changes in nature.  Ecological analyses are not complete (cf. Haraway 1991) as 
political ecologists have so elegantly demonstrated—the social-politics of ecology 
(both as scientific practice and as land or resources) shapes the way in which 
environments(s) are constructed and mobilised historically and geographically.  As a 
result, it is crucial that we develop theoretical and methodological practices that can 
critically interrogate what insights we can gain into changes in nature from an 
analysis of ecological and ‘other’ environmental imaginaries.   
 
Most importantly, as many ‘new’ ecologists and some political ecologists have 
highlighted, nature is not stagnant nor in equilibrium (Botkin 1990; O'Neill 2001; 
Zimmerer 1994).  Not only do environmental imaginaries and the social-political 
contestations over the environment change constantly, so do the natural (physical) 
processes.  Thus we need a way to theorise the relationships between nature and 
society that conceptualises both the human and non-human dimensions as non-linear, 
unstable and therefore highly contingent and context dependent.  In other words the 
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mutual constitution of social and natural (physical) processes shift continuously in 
addition to the processes themselves shifting constantly somewhat independently of 
each other. 
 
The Turn to Science Studies 
As a result of calls for more theoretical integration between nature and society, many 
critical geographers have drawn on the work science studies, particularly Bruno 
Latour’s actor network theory (Latour 1987; Latour 1993) to achieve that integration.  
ANT conceptualises nature-society processes as networks that are animated by both 
human and non-human actors (or actants).  The dualism of nature-society is rejected 
and replaced by networks which link together humans, organic (i.e. living) non-
humans, technological objects and ‘quasi-objects’ or ‘hybrid objects’ that are 
combinations of technology and living organisms (Castree and MacMillan 2001; 
Latour 1993; Murdoch 1997; Whatmore 1999).  Donna Haraway’s notion of the 
cyborg (1991) is emblematic of such objects.  The methodological task is to trace 
these networks in relationship to a phenomenon of interest, uncovering how different 
actants are recruited and play an active role in the extension of these networks.  In this 
way, the dualism of nature-society is undermined and the ways in which nature and 
society are mutually constituted becomes more evident.  Also, ANT does not take the 
relationships between various actants for granted, but rather examines how they are 
recruited and what influence they have on an ever changing network. 
 
Also at the core of critical geography inspired by science studies is the project of 
deconstructing the process of scientific knowledge production.  Central to this project 
is the insistence that environmental and ecological constructs are artefacts—
representations of objects and not the objects themselves (Demeritt 1998; Demeritt 
2001a; Haraway 1997; Latour 1987; Latour 1993).  Thus, ‘climate’ is an artefact of 
atmospheric and hydrological processes that are represented by ecologists as a ‘thing’ 
about which we currently have much concern.   
 
Most scholars working with science studies approaches do not reject the existence of 
physical processes, but rather insist that our understandings of those processes are 
representations and not ‘reality’.  This insight is crucial for validating other kinds of 
knowledges and environments that do not fit nicely into ecological understandings of 
nature.  Nature can be represented in many different ways, some which are more 
meaningful or useful than others for particular people in particular moments in history.  
This is not to suggest that it’s all relative, rather it is to highlight the importance of 
making moral and political judgements about which environments we seek to 
understand and protect (Haraway 1997).  I believe it is in this sense that Castree and 
Braun conclude their chapter The Construction of Nature and the Nature of 
Construction by saying, “… we need to fashion new—or refashion old—analytical 
and political tools, tools for making the future natures that we wish to inhabit,”  (1998 
p. 35).  ‘Science studies’ scholars thus seek to understand how the artefacts of science 
are produced politically, historically and in relation to other human and non-human 
actants. 
 
This strand of critical geography often does engage with ecological data such as 
remote sensed images, cartography, climate change models and geological data 
(Demeritt 2001a; Demeritt 2001b; Willems-Braun 1997).  This engagement with 
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ecological data, however, is done to deconstruct it and reveal the politics behind its 
production.  For example, despite Demeritt’s insistence that he does not contest the 
validity of global climate change models, he nevertheless does not engage with the 
results of the models except to discuss the politics of scientific uncertainty (2001a).  
The deconstruction of ecological data has lent crucial insights into the workings of 
science and the need to treat ecological data as partial and situated rather than 
universal and disembodied (Haraway 1991; Haraway 1997; Latour 1987; Longino 
1990).  But it doesn’t provide many insights into how else we can engage with socio-
natural change.  We need to use ecological data both because it is a valid way to 
understand nature (at least as valid as any other), but also because we don’t have a lot 
of alternatives.  The question is how do we incorporate ecological theory and data into 
our analyses? 
 
Despite contributing important insights, I would argue that the turn towards science 
studies has not brought critical geography much closer to an engagement with the 
‘natural’ (physical) consequences of socio-nature issues.  Instead, if a (partial) reading 
of the literature and recent conference papers at the AAG in New York and Los 
Angeles and the IBG in Belfast are any indication, science studies has served to pull 
critical geography away from an engagement with these crucial questions about 
nature.  I will try to support this claim based on what I see as five main theoretical and 
related methodological problems with ANT and related science studies approaches.  
 
The failings of science studies for critical geography 
1. The first critique I have of science studies approaches concerns the deconstruction 
of scientific practices.  In Science in Action Bruno Latour (1987) purports to open the 
black box of science by following the way that scientific knowledge comes to be 
accepted as ‘true’ by a community of scientists and what actants play a part in that 
construction.  This has helped to demonstrate how scientific knowledge can be 
socially constructed and yet actively shaped by non-human actants—ecological 
knowledge does not arise in an environmental vacuum.   
 
Yet, I argue that Latour places ‘Scientists’ into a black box.  He claims to follow 
Scientists at work in the laboratory, but he ascribes way too much agency and 
deliberate purpose to individual scientists (see also Schneider 2001 in reference to 
Demeritt 2001a).  I base my comments on my experience of working as a technician 
in a biochemical laboratory.  Most scientists ‘at the bench’ are painfully unaware of 
the larger context of their work, even within a strictly biological realm.  Thus, 
molecular biologists do not necessarily have a very complex understanding of animal 
physiology even though they study, for example, membrane proteins of animals 
cells—much less the politics of membrane activity.
3
  In addition, most scientists are 
not in positions of power to influence the research agendas they pursue, the kind of 
work they do on a daily basis, or the dissemination of their results.  The scientists who 
run large laboratories in some cases do fit well with the Scientist caricature of 
Latour’s but the vast majority of bench scientists do not.  Thus, science studies as it 
has been used by Latour and interpreted by critical geographers, does not help us to 
                                                
3
 Membrane proteins are responsible for transporting molecules across cell membranes.  Thus research 
into them is significant for cancer research (can they target cancer cells to ‘turn them off’ or kill them 
without harming healthy cells?), drug therapies (which drugs will be incorporated into which kinds of 
cells?) and many other medical applications with tremendous socio-economic implications. 
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understand the complex negotiations and power relations within scientific daily 
practices and how that is shaped by and reflected within the ecological constructs that 
scientists study.   
 
The compartmentalisation of scientific inquiry is as much (re)produced by the power 
relations within laboratories that keep bench scientists engaged in relatively narrow 
experimental realms and the funding opportunities that different scientists can access, 
as it is by the historical development of science and the physical apparatuses of 
laboratories.  I therefore suggest it is more useful to return to Escobar’s (1995) 
rendition of discourse and examine the way that discourses of science come to be 
dominant and to shape the practices of those operating within it, combined with a 
‘political ecology’ perspective that seeks to understand the cultural politics of 
knowledge production and ownership of scientific knowledge.  Perhaps simply 
extending the network inquiry a bit more deeply into the laboratory (or other scientific 
space) would suffice, but for me, this raises significant questions about how to 
prioritise the objects of inquiry in ANT.  Is the goal thick description of society and 
nature (as it may be for Latour as an Anthropologist) or is the goal understanding 
socio-environmental processes (see also the critiques of ANT in Castree and 
MacMillan 2001; Murdoch 1997)?   
 
2. My second critique is more directly related to the linking of society and nature in 
ANT.  Scholars that are working within an ANT framework seem to focus on tracing 
the relevant networks instead of the consequences of those networks (Castree and 
MacMillan 2001 p. 222 make a similar point).  Conference papers in particular reflect 
this theoretical and methodological commitment in that they present ‘thick’ 
descriptions of socio-natural networks that identify various organic, non-organic and 
quasi-objects that have all played a role in the development of a particular problem.  I 
remember sitting half in shock at the conclusion of a paper in NYC that traced the 
development of copper mining in the southwest USA.  The mining company—after 
using many other techniques and changes in management had occurred—used 
hydrochloric acid (HCL) to extract residual metal from the mining tailings, resulting 
in contamination of the ground water with HCL.  That was the conclusion, how the 
network circled around between the human, economic, technical, organic, and 
chemical events.  Echoing my thoughts, the discussant (Noel Castree) said he was left 
wondering ‘so-what’.  But that did not lead to a discussion about the ecological so-
what.  The ground water was polluted with one of the world’s most corrosive acids 
rendering it toxic to all but specific bacterial species.  Water moves and acids diffuse 
in water, thus the spatial extent of the HCL ‘contamination’ was large, albeit its 
concentration would be reduced with spreading (this was partially traced in the paper).  
While I don’t have any data to support it, based on what I know of HCL I can 
postulate that the environmental consequences for human and non-human species are 
dire.  Humans would have to find alternative sources of water (and could as they live 
in the USA) but non-human species may not recognise the danger until too late.  I 
asked myself, how did tracing the network of this problem get us any closer to dealing 
with the socio-natural consequences of this kind of mining?  How did it help us to 
build a politics that could prevent such practices in the future?   
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While I am certain the author of that paper built in more of the ‘so-what’ into 
publications based on that work,
4
 nevertheless, the first analysis was on the network 
and breaking down nature-society dualisms.   In short then, tracing the networks and 
identifying quasi-objects and non-human actants in much of ANT work, although 
certainly not all (cf. Robbins 2001), becomes a substitute for engagement with the 
consequences of those networks and actants in/on nature (and sometimes even the 
political consequences).  The theoretical and methodological focus turns to the 
networks and not the issues that drive an analysis of those networks in the first place. 
 
3. My third critique is the one I feel is most important of all five and one I believe 
others have not addressed.  The backbone of the networks in ANT is the actants which 
can be human, organic non-human, technological, or a combination, quasi-objects.  
Quasi-objects in particular seem to be emblematic of the breakdown between nature 
and society as they can be human produced, technological and organic (living) non-
human.  Latour argues quasi-objects have been kept ‘hidden’ and unacknowledged 
because they defied the nature-culture divide of modernist thought (Latour 1993).  
Making these objects visible is thus politically and theoretically critical to 
undermining that dualism.  Genetically engineered species such as OncoMouse™ 
(Haraway 1997) are classic examples of these kinds of quasi-objects, but roasted 
coffee beans are another (Whatmore and Thorne 1997).  It is no longer possible to 
classify them as either natural or technological, they are both.  I find this insight to be 
extremely useful particularly in drawing attention to the way in which what counts as 
‘natural’ and what does not is socially constructed and deeply problematic.  ‘Nature’ 
as an unexamined and pre-given category, allows people to appeal to what is ‘natural’ 
thereby exempting their actions from political and moral scrutiny.  As Haraway 
(1997) points out, such conceptions have underpinned ideas of racism for centuries 
and served to justify immoral treatment of those constituted as other.  To use a 
different example, scientists create new species through genetic manipulations, but 
they are seen as ‘laboratory animals’ instead of part of the gene pool of those species 
in nature.  This kind of separation obscures the difficult task at hand of making moral 
judgements about quasi-objects and recognising their political and environmental 
significance (Haraway 1997).  Thus ANT has helped to disrupt the division between 
society and nature and has provided a different way to talk about the living and non-
living objects of socio-natural issues without resorting to dualisms. 
 
But the focus on objects within ANT is exactly what I find problematic about it.  The 
actants of ANT are representations and temporary manifestations of socio-natural 
processes (Haraway 1997 p. 142-144).  While actively acknowledging that actants 
change as they are recruited within and play a part within networks, they nevertheless 
remain objects within ANT (cf. Latour 1993 p. 95-109).  To me, this serves only to 
further fetishize (following Haraway 1997 p. 142-144) quasi-objects and non-human 
actants.  Some actants, such as soil degradation in a coffee-based network (Whatmore 
and Thorne 1997), are processes, not objects.  Soil becomes an object within scientific 
inquiry when one talks of halting soil erosion like stopping traffic (when does soil 
movement really stop and what temporal scale is used to judge?).  Yet it is a complex 
physical, geo-chemical process that is represented as a thing for analytical and 
linguistic simplicity.  The representation of complex processes as objects is typical of 
                                                
4
 It was a fascinating case study and the material wonderfully rich which was part of the reason I was 
so disappointed by the conclusion.  He’d done such a great job of addressing both the social and 
ecological aspects I was waiting for him to tell us why that mattered. 
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many linguistic traditions.  And perhaps because of their taken-for-granted qualities, 
scientists and lay people alike often conflate the abstract conceptualisation and the 
process—leading to a variety of socio-natural consequences as Haraway (1997) 
discusses in relationship to genes.
5
   This is the mistake that ecologists make when 
they substitute the representations of their research subjects for things-in-themselves 
(Haraway 1997; Latour 1993).   
 
Yet within ANT, geo-chemical weathering of soils remains an object, even if that 
object might change to ‘soil conservation’ (from soil erosion) as it shifts in 
relationship to other actants in the network.  Thus, ANT examines the social-political 
processes of artefact construction instead of the ecological processes that produce 
those artefacts.  This does not help me to engage with the mutual constitution of soil 
processes, agricultural practices, global capitalist production of coffee, and 
consumption of coffee from the perspective of constantly changing natural processes 
and consequences.   ‘Soil conservation’ may signal an important shift in the discourse 
about the environment (and human land use practices), but not necessarily a shift in 
the underlying physical processes (soil weathering may not shift to what we consider 
‘conservation’ despite changes in land use and rhetoric about it).  Thus even with a 
focus on networks, an ANT analysis depends on objects and not on ecological 
processes, pulling us more into an object-based analysis rather than a process based 
analysis.  ANT, therefore as it’s been used so far, does not adequately engage with the 
socio-natural processes that we are concerned about. 
 
Perhaps the failing is methodological and critical geographers need to simply extend 
the networks of ANT further.  We have neglected delving into the networks of soil 
ecology and rather chosen to stop the analysis at ‘soil’.  This could perhaps be a 
useful analytical move, but again, would require engagement with ecological data 
(and other soil imaginaries as some political ecologists and cultural ecologists before 
them have done).  Can ANT take on board ecological constructs and data?  Will it still 
allow for a critique of the production of that data while actively incorporating it into 
the network?  I can see some potential for that and a more detailed discussion about it 
would be useful.  Robbins (2001) attempts such a synthesis in a recent article.  His 
analysis, however, did not incorporate a ‘network’ within the environment, he used 
ecological methods to analyse the environment and then linked the results to his 
ANT-inspired analysis (see also below).  This suggests that extending the networks 
further into nature may be difficult.  My next two points raise other questions about 
the adequacy of extending networks.  While such a move might be useful, is it enough 
or desirable theoretically and methodologically? 
 
4. My forth point is the most difficult to articulate.  To me, social and ecological 
processes are qualitatively different.  While I definitely argue for the ‘agency’ of non-
human actants (to use the language of ANT), and agree that humans and non-humans 
are mutually constituted, the agency of non-human actants is different from human 
agency.
 6
  In part this is because of human consciousness and our apparently unique 
                                                
5
 Haraway talks about the way that the fetishization of genes has allowed for them to be thought of as 
things that can be privatised, stored in genetic banks and encoded.  ‘Genes’ represent a dynamic 
biochemical process and are not in fact, things-in-themselves.  It is only by constructing them as 
things-in-themselves that genes can be owned, stored, etc. 
6
 After writing this section I was surprised to find a somewhat similar critique in Castree and 
MacMillan (2001 p. 221).  Here they draw from Lauier and Philo (1999) to ask whether the 
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ability to plan and modify our surroundings at scales and rates not done by other 
living species.  The premeditated and analytical aspects of this kind of agency are 
critical to my argument.  Non-human actants, while actively engaged in shaping their 
surroundings, do not engage in such large scale and rapid rate modifications and don’t 
analyse how and what changes they will implement.
7
   
 
Beavers are a classic example.  They create dramatic phase changes to their 
surroundings—beaver dams create wetlands or small lakes on rivers that then drown 
out their food species of aspen trees and woody shrubs.  They tend to eat themselves 
out of their homes and have to move onto another place.  The place they leave behind 
is often changed ‘permanently’ (over a long time scale) into a habitat for different 
plant and animal species than the one the beaver encountered originally.  But this kind 
of modification is not analysed by the beaver.  Experiments have shown that beavers 
build dams when they hear water running.  Beavers living in lakes (that don’t build 
dams) will build a dam in response to a tape played of running water.  While humans 
sometimes engage in similarly thoughtless ecological modifications, we nevertheless 
have the abilities to analyse and decide whether or not to repeat those modifications. 
 
If the agency of humans and non-humans are different, then the processes by which 
they mutually constitute each other are also somewhat different (although with some 
shared processes).  Is it adequate then to place humans and non-humans into networks 
‘side-by-side’ giving them the same analytical treatment as ANT attempts to do (see 
for example Watts and Goodman 1997; Whatmore and Thorne 1997; Whatmore and 
Thorne 1998)?  This is related to the issue of how to incorporate ecological data into 
an ANT analysis.  If we draw on theories of power, subjectivity and political economy 
to understand the social processes of a network, is it a simple matter to incorporate 
ecological processes to understand the physical aspects?  How do we link those 
processes back together?  What are the consequences for analytical understanding of 
socio-nature issues and building a useful politics?   
 
This is where ANT fails me.  ANT doesn’t help me to link the agential differences 
between human and non-human actants that are so crucial to building moral and 
political arguments about the need for humans to fundamentally change the way they 
act in the world.
8
  If non-human actants build networks in the same way as humans, 
                                                                                                                                       
indifference or flattening of difference between actants within ANT is problematic.  What I am 
suggesting here is both that indifference is a problem, and I’m extending that to argue that some ‘noun 
chunks’ and verb chunks are different and that this difference seriously challenges the utility of ANT 
as an explanatory paradigm for socio-nature. 
7
 I personally suspect that many marine mammals likely have the same cognitive abilities as humans, 
but they don’t seem to engage in modifications of their surroundings at anything like the scale and rate 
that humans do. 
8
 Here my critique is aimed more directly at geographers’ interpretations of ANT than Latour’s 
formulation mainly because within Latour’s work I think his purpose for defining actants is different 
(Latour 1993).  In We Have Never Been Modern, one of his central arguments is making a case for the 
importance of anthropological inquiry ‘at home’.  In addition, I think he is trying to suggest new ways 
of thinking about science and science studies.  Theoretically, he is interested in showing how different 
networks have greater or lesser dominance than others (i.e. which discourse is dominant), rather than 
engaging with the implications of socio-natural change.  These objectives are different than the 
applications to which many critical geographers have used ANT.  Geographical applications have 
largely focused around explaining particular human-environment interactions and current 
environmental controversies. 
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why do humans need to modify their behaviour or take responsibility for ecological 
change? 
 
5. To extend this argument in a slightly different direction, my fifth critique is not so 
much aimed at the turn towards science studies as it is aimed at ‘social nature’ 
geography more generally.  There is often a lack of adequate recognition in nature-
society geography that nature is not totally under our control nor completely 
understood by us.  Here I want to pick on the quote I used earlier from Braun and 
Castree (1998).  While I do think they intended that comment in the spirit in which I 
quoted it earlier, I found it a disturbing sentence.  To suggest that we need to “[make] 
the future natures that we wish to inhabit” (1998 p. 35) is to suggest that we can 
determine that.  Ecology, natural resource management, and other physical sciences 
have long since demonstrated that humans are nowhere near understanding the 
complexity of physical processes adequately to create environments (much less 
nature).  We may decide what we want, but it is far more likely that we will end up 
with something different materially and symbolically because of the nature-society 
nexus.  Nature-society geographers to date have provided us with innumerable 
examples of such outcomes.  But Braun and Castree’s appeal signalled to me that they 
have not taken seriously the conclusions of their own work and that of ecologists.  I 
found it especially ironic that Castree again basically repeats that phrase in their new 
book immediately following a section about the importance of recognising that 
humans cannot completely manipulate the physical environment (Castree 2001 p. 19).  
We cannot make the kind of nature(s) we wish to inhabit, which is for me the most 
fundamental message that comes from both ecology and critical geography.  And that 
is why we have serious cause for concern over the increasing ways in which the 
environment is socialised (cf. Katz 1998; Smith 1998).  
 
Instead of making the nature(s) we want to inhabit, critical geographers need to 
promote the message that we cannot make ‘nature’ and for that very reason the kind 
of novel, rapid rate and simultaneously larger and smaller scale ecological changes 
that are occurring as a result of human activities are cause for great alarm.  We have 
very little idea what the long-term consequences might be and at what rate they will 
occur but we have some idea that we could be unpleasantly surprised (see for example 
hypotheses on global climate change and the probability of a sudden, rapid rate 
change in climate rather than a gradual warming (Demeritt 2001a)).  Critical 
geography has shown how these kinds of rapid changes can have significant 
implications for society and particularly for social justice—also in ways that are 
unpredictable, but tend to affect marginalised people the most.  Global climate change 
scientists, despite their own evidence to the contrary, continue to make the political 
mistake of suggesting we can predict climate change.
9
  We can predict a range of 
scenarios and that has been useful, but we do not and cannot know what will happen.  
This makes the need for critical engagement with ecological theory and data and 
better conceptualisations of the relationships between social and ecological change 
that much more important.  I certainly do not want to leave the task of evaluating 
changes in nature entirely in the hands of ecologists for all the reasons that science 
studies scholars and critical geographers have so saliently pointed out. 
 
                                                
9
 This tendency is related, of course, to the roots of many physical sciences in positivist principles. 
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Where do we go from here? 
In the sections above I have tried to trace some of the key contributions but also some 
of the inadequacies of current work in critical nature-society geography.  I want to 
make it clear that critical nature-society geography has contributed a number of 
extremely important insights.  My purpose in this paper is not to reject those 
contributions but to push current work to incorporate more understanding of physical 
processes and to ask some important questions about how to accomplish such 
integration.  While there have been calls for more engagement with the material 
consequences of human-environment issues (Castree 2001; Castree and Braun 1998; 
Peet and Watts 1996; Zimmerer 1994), the analyses and theoretical positions taken by 
critical nature-society geographers have in my opinion taken us further away from 
such engagement.  In response, I have tried to highlight the importance of engaging 
with data and theories from the ecological sciences to grapple with the consequences 
of environmental change.  I argued that such engagement is critical for two main 
reasons.  First because it is clear that any kind of social-political action involves 
action by/in nature as well (the message from science studies), and second, because 
ecology is a very important source of knowledge about nature, even if it is a partial 
and situated source.  The main question remaining then is how do we integrate 
ecological analyses with the very sophisticated social theoretical approaches we use?   
 
This question has both theoretical and methodological consequences.  Theoretically 
we need to recognise the dynamic, contingent relationships between society, 
environment and hybrids (i.e. quasi-objects or quasi-processes).  ANT and ‘post-
structural dialectics’
10
—or multi-lectics as I prefer to think about the mutual 
constitution of various aspects of socio-nature—are moving in promising directions.  
Nevertheless, these conceptual frameworks cannot import ecological theories 
wholesale.  In part the problem lies with ecological theory itself because of its roots in 
systems theory which leaves little room for understanding the articulations between 
society and nature outside of feedback mechanisms (cf. Botkin 1990; O'Neill 2001).  
More significantly, it is extremely difficult to find an analytical entry into processes 
that are contingent and continuous.  In other words, Latour (and Haraway) has 
conceptualised quasi-objects as a way to theorise the continuum between society and 
nature, but as I pointed out earlier, this brings us back to an object-based analysis.  
How do we think about ‘quasi-processes’ that at various temporal-spatial points might 
be more ‘natural’ or more ‘social’?   
 
For example, how do we think about the socio-nature of water irrigation when the 
‘water’ in question begins as ‘pure’ but of course has various ‘natural’ elements in 
solution and suspension (i.e. minerals, ‘dirt’), yet, by the time it reaches the end of the 
irrigation pipe it has dissolved human-produced chemicals and organic wastes such 
that the concentration of H2O is so minimal that it is questionable whether it can be 
called ‘water’?
11
  At what point did it stop being water?  How do various 
concentrations of H2O articulate with social and power relations over water?  Is there 
some threshold point when the concentration of H2O becomes so low that there are 
                                                
10
 I am trying, perhaps unsuccessfully, to think of a succinct way to talk about the hybrid post-
structural-historical materialism approaches that are represented in Liberation Ecologies and related 
work. 
11
 This example comes from a talk given by Erik Swyngedouw at the University of Minnesota.  He did 
not engage with the chemical properties of water in his talk, but indicated that water quality declined as 
it moved through the system.  Some of the questions I raise here I asked him at the time. 
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‘suddenly’ different socio-political struggles, new people involved and productive 
relationships surrounding that liquid, or do these relationships also change on a 
continuum with decreasing concentrations of H2O?  What about from the perspective 
of non-humans, at what point does the ‘quasi-water’ become more harmful to them 
than nourishing?  These kinds of questions raise serious issues about the categories 
(actants) we chose within our analyses, how we work with the need to talk about 
relatively stable manifestations of processes as things,
 
and yet retain an analytical 
stance that recognises them as processes.
 12
   
 
 I thus find ANT to be more useful as a methodological technique than as a conceptual 
framework.  ANT’s object-based analysis doesn’t help to conceptualise actants that 
are in a state of constant change. Methodologically, however, it points to the need to 
examine a wide range of relationships that are connected to the problem at hand.  It 
avoids defining which relationships are important ahead of time—although I would 
also argue that we continue to be influenced by our ‘little theories’ of what we think is 
important (Burawoy 1991).  Nevertheless, when used in isolation, ANT doesn’t 
provide much insight into how to bound an investigation.  How do we determine 
which relationships are more important than others? 
 
I thus find ‘post-structural dialectics’ to be more useful than ANT theoretically.  By 
conceptualising mutually constitutive, dynamic relationships between analytical 
domains, one can conceive of relatively stable objects and relationships and yet 
investigate how they are embedded within each other, contingent and changing (see 
also Harvey 1996 although he does not engage with physical nature in the ways I'm 
suggesting).  At the same time, those analytical domains can be challenged and 
recognised as artificial constructs themselves.  ANT in some ways also offers such 
analytical possibilities, but dialectics begins with a set of relationships that are 
assumed to be important and seeks to analyse how they are important and what other 
relationships might also need to be included.  In other words, the subjects of analysis 
are theoretically defined rather than ‘discovered’ through the research process.  I 
certainly do not find this to be a ‘solution’ to the theoretical issues I raised above, 
however.  I would be interested in having a more detailed discussion about what 
challenges ecological theory raises for social theory and how to arrive at a better 
conceptualisation of these processes. 
 
Having said that, I am also wary of assuming that social theory is enough.  I think we 
need to work more closely with ecologists and physical geographers to develop better 
theoretical and methodological tools to examine socio-natural issues.  Not all 
scientific inquiry is working in a positivist, reductionist paradigm.  We need better 
ecological theories that represent ecological change in such a way that it takes 
seriously the social aspects of that change and moves away from systems theory.  
How can we link more effectively with ecologists and physical geographers to push 
both social and ecological theory?  As part of this we need to recognise that 
                                                
12
 Perhaps it is less a need a more of an historical convention in linguistics.  But I think there is also a 
material influence on this convention.  While the moor outside my window is constantly changing, it 
also remains a moor over decades and looks more or less the same.  Similarly, the paint on the outside 
of my house is constantly dissolving, but it nevertheless continues to be paint for many years (and then 
it becomes ‘peeling paint’).  In other words, change is temporally and spatially-scale dependent, and 
humans often perceive things as stable that are not on other temporal-spatial scales (or to other 
organisms). 
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ecological change is equally as complex as social change but in some ways 
qualitatively different.  What are dynamics of ‘quasi-objects’ and processes if we 
accept this difference?  For me this is still an open question that I do not think Latour 
or Haraway have addressed adequately.   
 
It also requires that we take seriously the concerns expressed by Stephen Schneider 
(2001) in his response to David Demeritt (2001a).  Schneider’s critique of Demeritt’s 
article on the construction of global climate change was in part based on what he sees 
as an unnecessarily philosophical account, and the impenetrable language.  He further 
challenged Demeritt on his interpretation of debates within the climate change 
community about the kinds of models that are most appropriate and the uncertainties 
inherent in them.  While I found Demeritt’s article to be far more helpful than 
problematic, I also remember how I felt my first few years in graduate school as I 
encountered these debates (and thus words) for the first time.  I hated all the words I 
had to look up in the dictionary again and again because they held no meaning for me.  
It is possible to talk about nature-society issues in a straightforward way and in the 
interests of interdisciplinary collaboration we need to work on retaining analytical 
complexity and promoting linguistic simplicity.
13
  We also need to take seriously 
Schneider’s critique of Demeritt’s claims about the way that global climate change 
scientists themselves represent their work.  While I agree with Demeritt that in 
popular publications ‘scientists’ tend to over-simplify the conclusions of their work 
(with serious political implications that we should challenge them on), we also need to 
engage with them as colleagues, taking seriously the implications of the debates that 
occur within their own journals. 
 
Methodologically there are also a number of challenges.  Most fundamentally, if 
ecological data is incorporated into a socio-environmental analysis, what data is 
relevant and how do the epistemological origins of that data matter?  Studies that have 
tried to incorporate ecological data have largely used it ‘side-by-side’ with social data 
(cf. Robbins 2001).  In Robbins excellent paper in the Annuals, the section talking 
about the ecological dynamics of ‘quasi-forests’ in India is inserted into the social-
political narrative.  He outlines the ecological significance in a separate section then 
links these results back into the narrative.  But how can we analyse that data in 
relationship to the social data—as mutually constitutive methodologically as well as 
theoretically?    
 
I cannot claim to have over come these issues, but one technique I have experimented 
with is using ecological and social data more explicitly together.  Whenever possible, 
I collect both ecological and social data on the same questions.  In my case, I was 
examining forest change in Nepal.  I worked with social and ecological data sets 
separately, and used the appropriate tests of ‘validity’ or ‘rigor’ that are conventional 
within the relevant disciplines for each data set.  In the analysis, however, I treated 
them as equivalent in terms of what they might tell me about forest change.  The most 
successful attempt I had with this was using oral histories and aerial photo 
interpretation of forest change.  I did not assume the aerial photos were ‘right’, rather 
I looked for the ways that the aerial photos and the oral histories gave me different 
narratives about forest change.  They did correspond to some extent, but they also 
were quite different.  If I had only looked at the aerial photos I would have concluded 
                                                
13
 Something which I fear I have not modelled in this paper! 
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that forest cover has changed very slightly (less than 5% total change in cover in 
twenty years).  The oral histories gave me a different scenario, however.  The 
villagers insisted that forest cover had improved significantly.  Rather than thinking 
the villagers were deluded, I examined the discrepancies between the data sets.  This 
helped me to understand what aspects of the forest the villagers valued the most and 
to give more importance to small areas on the aerial photos that had improved.  The 
result was that my interpretations of both data sets were far richer.  It would be 
interesting to discuss whether others have tried similar techniques and in what 
contexts this might or might not work.  It seems to me, however, that to examine 
socio-natural issues our methodologies need to also reflect the complexity and 
diversity of the issues at stake. 
 
I hope that this paper has raised a number of challenging questions for critical 
geographers and that we can have a lively discussion about them in Hungary.  
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